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Wittgenstein scholarship appears currently to be engaging 
in a deepening debate over the role of nonsense in 
Wittgenstein’s later philosophical work. For one party to 
this engagement, Wittgenstein’s later work pursues the 
project of exposing nonsense when it emerges during the 
course of philosophical discussions, and thereby provides 
a kind of therapeutic assistance to those philosophers who 
might otherwise have defended positions whose tenets 
include nonsensical remarks that “do not say anything” 
(Crary 5). This therapeutic reading argues in The New 
Wittgenstein and Wittgenstein in America particularly in the 
hands of James Conant that an austere interpretation of 
the role of nonsense in the Tractatus can be successfully 
extended to account for the project of Wittgenstein’s later 
writings as well. Opposing this therapeutic reading of 
Wittgenstein, P.M.S. Hacker has argued that Wittgenstein 
sees nonsense as arising from our attempts to deny 
grammatical rules by forming “nonsense which violates the 
grammar” (Baker 279). When philosophers begin to 
devolve into nonsensical remarks, Wittgenstein seemingly 
will not provide the form of therapy Hacker critiques, but 
rather will remind us of our rules of grammar in a way that 
The New Wittgenstein appears determined to resist. The 
text of Wittgenstein’s later collection On Certainty provides 
one case of a Wittgensteinian engagement with a 
philosophical discussion of knowledge, certainty, and 
error, a case for which each of these interpretations might 
wish, I suggest, to be able to account. On Certainty follows 
Wittgenstein’s involvement with G.E. Moore’s treatment of 
knowledge and skepticism, according to which I know I 
have two hands, and so can debunk a line of skeptical 
doubt, when I follow for my part along with Moore’s 
reasoning. Wittgenstein presents at least three forms of 
response to Moore, including accusations of nonsensical-
ity, attempts to locate the sense of Moore’s view, and 
assessments of Moore’s understanding of his own 
remarks. As the interplay of these themes unfolds, I 
suggest in the end that On Certainty pursues a diagnostic 
engagement with Moore’s philosophical discussions 
whose distinctive character neither the therapeutic reading 
nor Hacker’s interpretation has yet properly to appreciate.  
On Certainty presents a record of Wittgenstein’s ex-
tended entanglement with Moore’s treatment of knowledge 
and doubt in his essays in epistemology, an entanglement 
formed by the interplay of three primary themes – 
nonsense, sense, and understanding. Firstly, early in On 
Certainty, Wittgenstein indicates that during the discus-
sions Moore provides of epistemology, he advances 
apparent knowledge claims that may be viewed as 
nonsensical. Indeed, these moments within Wittgenstein’s 
treatment appear to manifest just the qualities that the 
therapeutic reading would lead us to expect. Wittgenstein 
finds Moore stepping into nonsense during the course of 
his work in epistemology: 
I know that there is a sick man lying here? Nonsense! I 
am sitting at his bedside, looking attentively into his face. 
– So I don’t know, then that there is a sick man lying 
here? Neither the question nor the assertion has sense. 
(OC 10) 
Such passages as this confirm the presence of a concep-
tion of nonsense in Wittgenstein’s treatment of Moore. As 
Wittgenstein addresses seeming knowledge claims typical 
of Moore’s discussion, he finds both the alleged assertion 
and denials of knowledge to be characteristically lacking in 
sense. As Wittgenstein considers it, when we suggest 
“‘The expression “I do not know” makes no sense in this 
case’…of course it follows from this that ‘I know’ makes no 
sense either” (OC 58). Wittgenstein certainly appears to be 
employing a conception of nonsense familiar from his 
earlier writing, according to which nonsense so to speak 
lacks truth value, and the negation of nonsense yields 
nonsense. Texts such as these help to support the notion 
that Wittgenstein is employing nonsense as a term of 
criticism when he explores the work of other philosophers. 
This involvement with charges of nonsensicality therefore 
presents us with a question of whether Wittgenstein 
proceeds to handle Moore’s nonsense in a way that 
Conant and the therapeutic reading would lead us to 
expect. 
On Certainty does not appear to rest with its conclusion 
that Moore’s epistemology advances nonsense. Wittgen-
stein instead appears to search for a way of capturing the 
sense that Moore’s references to knowing he has hands, 
or that he is a human being, might be able to have. The 
text is relatively direct on this point: 
Anyone who is unable to imagine a case in which one 
might say “I know this is my hand” (and such cases are 
rare) might say that these words were nonsense. True, 
he might also say “Of course I know – how could I not 
know?” – but then he would possibly be taking the 
sentence “this is my hand” as an explanation of the 
words “my hand” (OC 412). 
Wittgenstein suggests that we can find a sense for an 
expression such as ‘I know this is my hand’ when we 
consider that this talk of knowing marks those explanations 
of our uses of language (sometimes spoken of as 
descriptions of the grammar) that we ourselves are able to 
provide. Wittgenstein proposes that the alleged knowledge 
claims Moore includes in his response to skepticism may 
carry some sense, although not perhaps in the way we 
had expected. The presence of a sense arrives as a 
discovery during Wittgenstein’s investigations: 
But now it is correct to say “I know” in the contexts that 
Moore mentioned, at least in particular circumstances. 
(Indeed, I do not know what “I know I am a human 
being” means. But even that might be given a sense.) 
For each one of these sentences I can imagine circum-
stances that turn it into a move in one of our language 
games, and by that it loses everything that is philosophi-
cally astonishing. 
What is odd is that in such a case I always feel like 
saying (although it is wrong): “I know that – so far as one 
can know such a thing.” That is incorrect, but something 
right is hidden behind it (OC 622-23). 
When Wittgenstein dwells longer over Moore’s epistemo-
logical comments, he finds that, even in spite of the 
possible confusions into which Moore may have strayed, a 
sense can still be found for Moore’s employment of 
selected apparent knowledge claims during his discus-
sions of epistemology. By saying that he knows he has two 
hands, Moore would, it begins to seem, be saying that his 
having two hands is not open to doubt in the context in 




which he issues this remark, and that he knows how to use 
the language involved – although why it is that he is not 
able to entertain this seeming doubt still remains for us to 
resolve. Therefore, while Wittgenstein at the outset of his 
treatment accuses Moore of issuing nonsense, his more 
extended discussion begins to recognize the sense that 
Moore’s remarks against skepticism may be able to 
sustain. What first seems nonsense is now a candidate for 
sense, albeit a candidate that does not reveal its sense in 
a straightforward fashion. 
On Certainty devotes perhaps the majority of its atten-
tion to the specific character of the confusions into which 
Moore’s discussions risk beginning to fall. If Moore’s 
treatment of knowledge were not to have its sense 
perspicuated, or if Moore were to seem to reject the 
perspicuations Wittgenstein proffers, Wittgenstein sug-
gests that it may become uncertain whether he and Moore 
understand each other. The trouble with Moore’s conten-
tions, that he knows he has hands, that he knows he is a 
human being, is that they confer upon Moore the risk that 
he does not understand his remarks, and the risk that we 
do not understand him in the context in which he issues 
them. Wittgenstein indicates that Moore’s understanding 
could possibly be in jeopardy if he were somehow to avoid 
acknowledging, with Wittgenstein, that knowledge and in-
dubitability often are anathema. To call a statement indubi-
table in a particular context is to suggest that a speaker 
who denies it may very well not understand it. 
That I am a man and not a woman can be verified, but if 
I were to say that I was a woman, and then tried to 
explain the error by saying I hadn’t checked the state-
ment, the explanation would not be accepted. 
The truth of my statements is the test of my under-
standing of these statements. 
That is to say: if I make certain false statements, it 
becomes uncertain whether I understand them (OC 79-
81). 
In the case of particular remarks, whether about one’s 
hands or humanity, among other things, propounding 
falsehoods has the potential to speak against one’s 
understanding of these remarks. Whether we convict a 
speaker of non-understanding may depend on our readi-
ness to allow that he may have momentarily misspoken. If 
a speaker appears unwilling to retract a falsehood, or even 
if he seems unwilling to disallow the very possibility of a 
falsehood, then the shadow of nonunderstanding begins to 
fall over his case. 
It’s not a matter of Moore’s knowing that there’s a hand 
there, but rather that we should not understand him if he 
were to say “Of course I may have erred about this”. We 
should ask “What is it like to make such an error as 
that?” – e.g. what’s it like to discover that it was an 
error? (OC 32) 
Wittgenstein suggests in passages such as these that 
certain statements speak quite strongly about a person’s 
understanding, especially those indubitable statements 
whose denial we attempt either to entertain or to assert. 
Wittgenstein returns to this issue of nonunderstanding in 
the case of certainties throughout the text. 
There are cases such that, if someone gives signs of 
doubt where we do not doubt, we cannot confidently 
understand his signs as signs of doubt. 
I.e.: if we are to understand his signs of doubt as such, 
he may give them only in particular cases and may not 
give them in others. 
In certain circumstances a man cannot make an error. 
(“Can” is used here logically, and the proposition does 
not mean that a man cannot say anything false in those 
circumstances.) If Moore were to pronounce the oppo-
site of those propositions which he declares certain, we 
should not just not share his opinion: we should regard 
him as demented (OC 154-55). 
Wittgenstein contends that certain statements do not lend 
themselves to our doubt, denial, or even our entertainment 
of their falsehood, without casting our understanding of 
these statements under suspicion, and leading others’ 
understanding of us into confusion. Yet Wittgenstein 
believes that Moore has risked entertaining just these sorts 
of falsehoods by contending that he knows – that he 
knows he has hands or is human. Moore’s manner of 
responding to skepticism, while on the one hand possibly 
making sense as we have seen Wittgenstein suggest 
earlier, on the other possibly points to a failure of under-
standing within Moore’s account. Wittgenstein does not 
conclude that Moore is indeed a case of failed understan-
ding. Instead, Wittgenstein acknowledges this prospect as 
at least a possibility, one that his interpretation appears to 
take steps to avoid. 
How, then, are we to understand the character of 
Wittgenstein’s involvement with Moore’s work in episte-
mology? If we are to believe the therapeutic reading, 
Wittgenstein should identify the moments of nonsense 
within Moore’s discussions, bringing us to see that Moore’s 
terms “haven’t (yet) been given any significant use” (Crary 
7) when they appear in his seeming claims to knowledge. 
The notion that Wittgenstein does find a sense for Moore’s 
remarks makes it difficult to maintain that these “do not say 
anything” (Crary 7) according to Wittgenstein’s more 
developed account: what they say is, at least possibly, that 
Moore speaks a language within which certain statements 
characterize the grammar and can be regarded as true. 
For Conant, Wittgenstein’s therapy involves “recognizing 
sentences…as nonsensical” (McCarthy 61). Yet Wittgen-
stein’s therapy does not involve throwing away Moore’s 
remarks so much as reclaiming them, offering them a 
specific way to make sense, albeit not a way we might 
have expected. On the other hand, if we are to follow 
Hacker in regarding the negation of grammatical proposi-
tions as nonsense, then Wittgenstein’s entire discussion of 
error and understanding becomes difficult to accommo-
date. Most of Hacker’s textual evidence for this treatment 
of nonsense is drawn from manuscripts circa 1930 that do 
not necessarily match the later developed view (Hacker 
12-13). Denying a grammatical proposition is not an error, 
and insisting on its denial is nonunderstanding – but this 
does not lead the affirmation of these propositions to be 
nonsensical. Rather, the affirmation of such propositions is 
a sign of understanding them, and we do not understand 
nonsense. Affirming a grammatical proposition is not 
nonsensical, leaving its negation difficult to classify as 
nonsense in any conclusive sense. So neither Conant nor 
Hacker appears quite able to account for the character of 
On Certainty, if these issues of sense and understanding 
unfold in the way I have been suggesting. 
In closing, I believe that the genuine character of Witt-
genstein’s response to Moore is that of diagnosis, but not 
one of the form the therapeutic reading would expect. 
Wittgenstein does cry “Nonsense!”, but then this seems 
only to have signaled a search for sense. When a sense is 
found, it arrives accompanied by a diagnosis: 
Moore’s view really comes down to this: the concept 
‘know’ is analogous to the concepts ‘believe’, ‘surmise’, 




‘doubt’, ‘be convinced’ in that the statement “I know…” 
can’t be an error (OC 21). 
To Wittgenstein, Moore came in contact with the themes of 
error and nonunderstanding, but misassigned these 
features without acknowledging how knowledge involves 
the presence and removal of doubt. “I know…” can be an 
error, and often is. Moore “overlooked” (OC 21) this point, 
and so overlooked the interplay of knowledge, error, and 
understanding that Wittgenstein helps to perspicuate. 
Moore has challenged Wittgenstein to understand his 
remarks, not to throw them away, in the end. 
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